GIFT   OF 


$eace  Jfountiatton 


THE   'SIXTY-SEVEN  REASONS' 
OF  THE  NAVY  LEAGUE 

AN  ANALYSIS  OF  THE  ARGUMENTS  SET  FORTH 
IN  BEHALF  OF  NAVAL  EXTENSION 


BY 

EDWARD  BENJAMIN  (KREHBIEL 

PROFESSOR  OF  MODERN  HISTORY 
IN  STANFORD  UNIVERSITY 


"Overgrown  military  establishments  are,  under 
any  form  of  government,  inauspicious  to 
liberty,  and  are  to  be  regarded  as  peculiarly 
hostile  to  republican  liberty."— WASHINGTON 


WORLD  PEACE  FOUNDATION 

Boston,  Massachusetts 
February,  1913 


VA* 

Ks 


THE  SIXTY-SEVEN  REASONS  OF  THE 
NAVY  LEAGUE 

EDWARD  BENJAMIN  KREHBIEL 

The  Navy  League  of  the  United  States  has  just  is- 
sued a  "petition  for  legislation  reorganizing  the  person- 
nel of  the  navy."  The  petition  also  recommends  the 
adoption  of  "A  continuing  and  consistent  program  of 
naval  construction,  to  be  determined  by  a  Council  of 
National  Defense  duly  authorized  by  Congress.  To  fix 
the  country's  standard,  the  proposed  Council  of  National 
Defense  should  take  into  consideration  the  naval  pro- 
grams and  military  strength  of  possible  opponents." 

No  one  is  likely  to  take  exception  to  a  proposal  to  es- 
tablish a  commission  to  investigate  the  actual  needs  of 
this  country  for  defense.  On  the  contrary,  the  great  ma- 
jority of  citizens  will  approve  of  an  honest  investi- 
gation of  these  needs.  As  far,  then,  as  this  is  con- 
templated, the  authors  of  the  suggestion  deserve  com- 
mendation. 

Unhappily,  the  circular  of  the  Navy  League  indicates 
that  the  League  is  interested  in  having  the  navy  enlarged, 
instead  of  having  the  need  of  enlargement  investigated. 
This  appears  from  the  fact  that  it  recommends :  "  a  con- 
tinuing and  consistent  program  of  naval  construction,  to 
be  determined  by  a  Council  of  National  Defense" ;  which, 
then,  would  see  that  the  navy  grew,  rather  than  "fix  the 
country's  standard"  according  to  our  needs.  That  this  is 
the  purpose  of  the  proposed  commission  is  made  clear  by 
the  circumstance  that  the  circular  gives  "sixty-seven  rea- 
sons and  aphorisms"  for  a  strong  navy  —  not  for  the 


2  THE  SIXTY-SEVEN  REASONS 

creation  of  a  commission  to  investigate  our  need  of  a 
strong  navy. 

Now,  however  warmly  we  should  welcome  an  impar- 
tial and  honest  report  upon  our  needs  in  relation  to  other 
states,  we  must  instantly  and  positively  reject  a  proposal 
to  appoint  a  commission  whose  program  and  recommen- 
dations are  prescribed.  There  are  now  enough  forces 
promoting  militarism,  without  a  commission  which,  pre- 
tending to  examine  the  question  of  defense,  will  render 
a  foreordained  verdict,  and  will  receive  credit  merely  be- 
cause it  is  official.  The  country  is  better  off  with  special 
interests  and  special  pleas  stripped  of  an  official  cloak. 

The  circular  in  question  advocates  a  "strong  navy." 
What  that  means  is  nowhere  indicated.  That  our  pres- 
ent navy  is  not  regarded  as  strong,  appears  from  the  fact 
that  the  League  is  active ;  for  if  our  fleet  were  considered 
adequate,  there  would  be  no  purpose  in  the  activities  of 
the  League.  From  this  it  appears  that  what  is  desired 
by  the  promoters  of  this  commission  is  a  navy  that  shall 
be  stronger  than  the  one  we  now  have. 

The  sixty-seven  reasons1  (there  are  really  only  sixty- 
six)  consist  of  short  sentences  or  quotations,  often  ax- 
iomatic in  form,  postulating  the  broadest  generalizations. 
Many  of  them  in  a  single  line  assert  a  world  of  untruth 
or  half-truth,  and  it  would  take  pages  to  furnish  convinc- 
ing proof  of  their  fallacy.  In  many  cases  the  reasons  are 
no  reasons  at  all,  for,  even  granting  them  to  be  true, 
they  have  no  bearing  on  the  question  whether  or  not  our 
present  navy  is  strong  or  whether  it  ought  to  be  increased. 
The  reasons  may  be  grouped  under  the  following 
headings,  each  representing  one  of  the  grounds  upon 
which  the  demand  for  a  "strong  navy"  is  based : 

1These  are  given  in  the  appendix  beyond.    For  purposes  of 
convenience  of  reference,  numbers  have  been  given  to  them. 


OF  THE  NAVY  LEAGUE  3 

I.  Opinions  and  quotations  (12,  13,  17,  49,  50,  57,  58, 
59,  60,  64,  65,  66),  the  service  the  navy  renders  2.  to 
commerce  and  trade  (26,  32,  35,  36),  3.  to  science  and 
invention  (27,  37,  39,  41,  42,  43),  4.  to  education  (28, 
29>  30),  5-  to  the  general  welfare  (2,  33,  34,  38,  40,  44, 
45,  47,  56),  6.  to  economy  [the  navy  as  insurance]  (25, 
31),  7.  the  inadequacy  of  other  means  (51,  53,  54,  55,  56, 
60),  8.  American  diplomacy  and  policies  (18,  19,  20,  21,. 
22,  23,  24,  46,  48,  52),  9.  history  (i,  3,  4,  5,  6,  7, 
8,  9,  10,  n),  10.  the  uncertainty  of  the  future  (61,  62, 
63),  ii.  national  defense  (12,  13,  14,  15,  16). 

A  dozen  of  the  reasons  are  merely  opinions  or  quota- 
tions. An  opinion,  however  bluntly  or  epigramatically 
stated,  is  not  an  argument;  and  it  does  not  improve  the 
situation  to  give  some  one's  else  opinion  in  quotation 
marks. 

"The  navy  is  our  main  defense,"  is  not  an  axiomatic 
truth,  even  if  it  is  so  stated ;  it  is  an  opinion.  It  can  be 
asserted  with  greater  assurance  that  square  dealing  and 
sound  business  and  a  healthy  body  politic  are  our  main 
defense. 

"Naval  power  is  a  legitimate  factor  in  international 
settlements,  because  it  is  the  evidence  of  national  effi- 
ciency." Even  if  the  second  part  of  this  proposition  be 
granted,  the  first  is  not  the  necessary  conclusion.  How- 
ever, the  second  part  is  not  true.  Naval  power  may  be 
one  of  many  indications  of  national  efficiency,  but  it  is  not 
"the  evidence/'  If  it  were,  how  came  Carthage,  which 
indisputably  had  supreme  naval  power  at  the  outset  of 
the  ancient  conflict,  to  succumb  to  Rome?  And  who 
dares  to  defend  the  proposition  that  Switzerland,  Hol- 
land or  the  United  States  are  less  efficient  nations  than 
Great  Britain,  which  notoriously  has  the  naval  power? 


4  THE  SIXTY-SEVEN  REASONS 

"Better  to  be  despised  for  too  anxious  apprehensions 
than  be  ruined  by  too  confident  security."  There  prom- 
ises to  be  ruin  in  the  train  of  the  present  policy  of  "anx- 
ious apprehensions,"  —  financial  ruin.  It  is  precisely  this 
ruin  that  anti-naval  expansionists  seek  to  avert. 

Washington  is  quoted  in  behalf  of  a  strong  navy: 
"There  is  a  rank  due  to  the  United  States  among  nations 
which  will  be  withheld,  if  not  absolutely  lost,  by  the  repu- 
tation of  weakness.  If  we  desire  to  avoid  insult,  we  must 
be  able  to  repel  it.  If  we  desire  to  secure  peace,  one  of 
the  most  powerful  instruments  of  our  rising  prosperity, 
it  must  be  known  that  we  are  at  all  times  ready  for  war." 
These  words  were  uttered  over  a  hundred  years  ago, 
when  our  country  was  in  its  very  infancy,  when  it  had 
practically  no  navy  at  all,  when  it  had  possible  foes  on  the 
frontiers,  and  when  Europe  was  distinctly  hostile.  Those 
conditions  are  no  more.  Even  if  Washington's  words  be 
taken  prophetically — instead  of  being  applied  to  the  con- 
ditions of  the  time  when  spoken — they  say  nothing  in 
favor  of  a  navy  larger  than  the  one  we  now  have !  We 
have  rank,  and  are  able  to  repel  insult ;  and  we  have  no 
reputation  for  weakness.  Furthermore,  peace  is  in  this 
very  quotation  pronounced  to  be  a  great  boon ;  and  what 
Washington  thought  of  war  can  best  be  told  in  his  own 
words  directed  to  the  Marquis  de  la  Rouerie :  "My  first 
wish  is  (although  it  is  against  the  profession  of  arms, 
and  would  clip  the  wings  of  some  of  our  young  soldiers 
who  are  soaring  after  glory)  to  see  the  whole  world  in 
peace,  and  the  inhabitants  of  it  as  one  band  of  brothers 
striving  who  should  contribute  most  to  the  happiness  of 
mankind."  In  his  farewell  address,  Washington  further 
said :  "Overgrown  military  establishments  are,  under  any 
form  of  government,  inauspicious  to  liberty,  and  are  to 


OF  THE  NAVY  LEAGUE  5 

be  regarded  as  particularly  hostile  to  republican  liberty." 
Washington  is  hardly  the  man  to  quote  in  favor  of  naval 
expansion ! 

Reason  59  is  an  anonymous  quotation:  "Obviously 
the  permanent  peace  of  the  world  can  be  secured  only 
through  the  gradual  concentration  of  preponderant  mili- 
tary strength  into  the  hands  of  the  most  pacific  communi- 
ties." This  statement  is  undoubtedly  one  of  the  League's 
"aphorisms,"  for  it  corresponds  with  Webster's  defini- 
tion of  an  aphorism  as  "a  sharply  defined  sentence  re- 
lating to  abstract  truth  rather  than  to  practical  matters." 
For  is  anything  more  visionary  than  the  proposal  to  con- 
tinue military  rivalry  and  war  to  the  date  when  the  pa- 
cific communities  shall  emerge  as  supreme?  Even  if  the 
proposal  were  accepted,  one  would  be  compelled  to  ask 
when  the  preponderant  military  strength  would  be  more 
in  the  hands  of  pacific  communities  than  to-day.  Cer- 
tainly England,  France,  Germany  and  the  United  States 
have  the  preponderant  military  strength;  and,  accord- 
ing to  the  professions  of  their  statesmen  and  military 
representatives,  they  are  pacific.  And  if  they  are  not 
pacific  in  fact,  to  whom  will  the  Navy  League  have 
us  look?  Then,  too,  this  position  is  altogether  incom- 
patible with  reason  13 :  "Undefended  resources  invite  ag- 
gression." China  is  presumably  a  case  in  point:  "China's 
policy  of  evading  militarism  on  both  land  and  sea  has 
been  accompanied  by  disastrous  defeats  and  untold  humil- 
iation." If  this  is  true,  at  whose  hands?  At  the  hands  of 
the  "pacific  communities"  mentioned  above  who  have 
naval  power,  such  as  the  Navy  League  advocates.  China 
furnishes  the  best  evidence  of  the  insincerity  of  the  plea 
of  a  navy  to  be  used  for  national  defense  only.  When  the 
true  history  of  China  for  the  last  fifty  years  is  written  it 
will  not  be  the  credit  of  China  that  suffers. 


6  THE  SIXTY-SEVEN  REASONS 

"The  money  for  American  battleships  is  paid  to  Amer- 
ican workingmen,  American  builders,  and  American 
craftsmen."  This  means  that,  to  give  more  work  at  home, 
we  should  increase  our  navy.  The  doctrine  is  dangerous. 
It  ought  first  to  be  shown  that  it  is  proper  for  the  govern- 
ment to  tax  all  of  us  in  order  to  give  employment  to  some 
of  us;  and,  then,  that  navy-building  is  the  only  way  in 
which  the  government  can  find  employment.  And  neither 
of  these  can  be  proven. 

The  circular  of  the  Navy  League  justifies  its  propos- 
als on  the  ground  that  the  demands  of  the  navy  have  stim- 
ulated invention ;  that  the  navy  has  participated  in  arctic 
exploration  and  relief,  in  the  Coast  and  Geodetic  Survey, 
in  the  establishment  of  lighthouses,  in  work  of  the 
Weather  Bureau,  and  has  done  work  for  the  Hydro- 
graphic  Office  and  on  the  Isthmian  Canal  route;  it  even 
mentions  the  relief  work  done  in  the  earthquakes  at  Mes- 
sina, Martinique,  and  San  Francisco  as  arguments  for  a 
strong  navy.  All  these  activities  are  most  commendable ; 
but  it  would  seem  that  the  attempt  to  advance  them  as 
reasons  for  a  strong  navy  would  fail  from  the  sheer 
weight  of  absurdity.  No  one  will  grant  that  the  present 
expensive  navy  was  needed  for  these  purposes ;  for  most, 
if  not  all,  of  it  was  done  by  small  vessels  —  and  dread- 
naughts  can  by  no  stretch  of  imagination  be  made  essen- 
tial to  work  of  this  kind.  As  for  the  benefits  of  navy 
building  on  the  production  of  high-grade  steel,  it  were 
well  to  remember  that  the  Iroquois  Theatre  fire  in  Chi- 
cago, and  the  Titanic  disaster  taught  useful  lessons 

but  wholesome  by-products  do  not  prove  the  wholesome- 
ness  of  the  source  from  which  they  spring.  And  this  is 
especially  the  case  when  there  are  other  ways  of  achiev- 
ing the  same  end.  Invention  has  flourished  enormously 


OF  THE  NAVY  LEAGUE  7 

apart  from  the  army  and  navy.  A  navy  equipped  with 
instruments  for  killing  is  not  necessary  to  stimulate  inven- 
tion. A  small  fraction  of  the  cost  of  our  fleet  offered  an- 
nually in  bonuses  for  useful  inventions  would  have  the 
same  effect;  for  the  inventor  works  for  the  sake  of  the 
reward,  not  for  the  love  of  the  navy. 

Even  more  extravagant  is  the  dictum :  "The  navy 
is  a  school  of  efficiency,  teaching  many  trades;  teaching 
discipline  and  cleanliness  to  young  men,  a  large  portion  of 
whom  are  so  young  that  they  can  hardly  be  considered 
as  producing  units.  The  navy  as  a  trade  school  has  been 
called  'Our  Great  National  University.'  It  returns  to  civil 
life  annually  as  many  trained,  efficient,  and  patriotic  young 
men  as  are  graduated  from  the  five  leading  universities  of 
the  country."  At  the  very  least,  this  is  bland.  That  such 
an  assertion  can  be  made,  shows  that  respect  for  American 
intelligence  is  not  the  foundation  on  which  this  particular 
plea  for  armament  rests.  The  actual  cost  of  the  navy  for 
1912  was  about  $130,000,000.  This  sum  is  many  times 
what  all  our  universities  and  colleges  consume  per  year. 
The  slightest  fraction  of  that  money  could  secure  all  the 
efficiency,  discipline,  cleanliness,  and  education  which  the 
navy  professes  to  teach.  And  do  these  efficient  gradu- 
ates of  the  navy,  whose  training  is  paid  for  by  the  gov- 
ernment, render  the  country  services  that  are  commensu- 
rate to  the  money  spent  on  them,  or  to  the  service  ren- 
dered by  ordinary  college  graduates  who  have  to  pay 
their  own  way?  The  former  ought,  in  justice,  to  serve 
their  country  incomparably  more  ably  and  abundantly  than 
college  graduates,  for  they  have  received  their  "education" 
at  the  public  charge,  at  vastly  greater  cost. 

Again,  the  navy  is  justified  by  the  police  work  it  has 
done,  in  suppressing  the  Barbary  pirates,  the  African 


8  THE  SIXTY-SEVEN  REASONS 

slave  trade,  in  protecting  the  fur  seals,  and  our  mission- 
aries and  citizens  abroad,  in  suppressing  insurrections  in 
the  West  Indies  and  the  Southern  republics.  Everyone 
favors  the  enforcement  of  law  and  the  suppression  of 
disorder,  the  peace  advocate  before  all  others.  He  is  par- 
ticularly interested  in  the  maintenance  of  law  and  order 
and  the  suppression  of  lawlessness  and  force.  Hence  he 
will  be  the  first  to  favor  a  military  or  naval  force  that  is 
designed  and  necessary  to  maintain  law  and  order.  But 
to  say  that  maintaining  order  is  a  good  thing  does  not 
lead  to  the  conclusion  that  we  need  a  larger  navy.  Logic 
remains  logic  even  here.  It  does  not  follow  that  because 
our  army  did  splendid  police  duty  at  the  time  of  the  San 
Francisco  fire,  it  should  be  made  larger  than  it  is  or  than 
Germany's. 

As  to  the  Barbary  pirates,  they  were  suppressed  a 
hundred  years  ago  and  by  a  dozen  vessels,  all  of  them 
small  compared  with  modern  ships.  How,  then,  can 
anyone  mention  the  Barbary  pirates  to  prove  the  need  for 
a  larger  navy  to-day?  If  the  case  of  the  pirates  proves 
anything  in  this  connection  it  is  that  the  navy  is  very 
much  overgrown ;  for  where  are  the  pirates  against  whom 
our  present  navy  can  pretend  to  protect  us?  The  intro- 
duction of  steam  vessels  contributed  as  much  to  suppress- 
ing piracy  as  did  navies.  Piracy  is  a  thing  of  the  past. 
African  slave  trade  is  no  more.  No  navy  of  the  size  of 
ours  is  necessary  to  protect  fur  seals.  No  navy  of  any 
size  can  prevent  seal  poaching  until  the  nations  inter- 
ested in  it  co-operate.  And  when  they  do,  as  they  have 
for  the  past  twenty  years,  all  this  work  can  be  and  has 
been  carried  on  by  a  few  revenue  cutters. 

The  "strong  navy"  is  justified  by  its  services  to  com- 
merce and  trade ;  and  it  is  asserted  that  "the  navy  is  one  of 


OF  THE  NAVY  LEAGUE  9 

the  foundations  of  national  credit  and  is  insurance  against 
the  unsettled  conditions  of  trade  and  commerce  which 
would  be  coincident  with  a  reputation  for  naval  weak- 
ness." This  is  adequately  answered  by  the  fact  that  cer- 
tain lesser  powers,  such  as  Norway  and  Sweden,  Denmark 
and  Holland,  enjoy  credit  and  trade  conditions  that  are 
equal,  if  not  superior,  to  those  of  the  great  naval  powers. 

As  to  insurance,  it  is  foolish  to  take  out  an  insurance 
policy  on  fireproof  structures.  And  as  far  as  the  navy 
claims  to  insure  or  protect  the  great  bulk  of  American 
property  and  commerce,  this  is  exactly  what  is  being 
done ;  for  great  parts  of  our  country  and  of  its  trade  are 
absolutely  secure  from  any  possible  invasion  or  foe.  The 
analogy  of  navy  protection  to  insurance  is  defective  in 
another  respect:  for  in  ordinary  insurance  the  man  who 
receives  the  benefits  pays  the  premium,  whereas,  in  the 
case  of  the  navy,  if  it  protects  commerce  at  all  —  as  it 
certainly  does  not  in  time  of  peace — the  whole  country 
pays  the  premium  for  the  benefit  of  the  group  interested 
in  foreign  trade.  One  is  also  forced  to  question  the  char- 
acter of  insurance  which,  without  increasing  security, 
merely  becomes  more  expensive  every  time  the  premium 
is  paid.  We  build  a  dreadnaught  or  two  under  the  impres- 
sion that  we  are  making  our  commerce  securer ;  hence  we 
are  told  that  our  contributions  are  like  premiums  on  insur- 
ance. Our  "possible  foe"  does  likewise.  In  retaliation 
we  increase  our  premiums;  again  he  follows.  And  so 
on  indefinitely.  Yet  in  the  end  our  commerce  is  not  one 
whit  safer  than  it  was  at  the  beginning.  Does  such 
insurance  insure?  Certainly  it  is  not  what  is  ordinarly 
meant  by  insurance. 

Several  reasons  assert  the  inadequacy  of  other  means 
of  settlement.  This  is  not  only  opinion,  but  it  is  opinion 


10  THE  SIXTY-SEVEN  REASONS 

that  disagrees  with  the  general  facts  of  the  case.  To  be- 
gin with,  the  other  means  have  never  been  given  the  trial 
that  force  has  had.  They  never  have  had  even  an  appre- 
ciable percentage  of  the  money  spent  upon  them  that 
armies  and  navies  have  had.  Furthermore,  when  they 
have  been  tried  they  have  succeeded  remarkably  well,  for 
up  to  the  present  time  no  case  of  true  international  arbi- 
tration has  failed  of  acceptance. 

This  failure  to  test  other  means  adequately  is  apparent 
in  the  case  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  This  Doctrine  is 
maintained  at  an  enormous  cost  to  our  country,  and  the 
Navy  League  avers  that  we  must  devote  even  more  money 
to  this  purpose.  Now,  in  so  far  as  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is 
designed  to  maintain  the  peace  of  the  WesternHemisphere 
it  meets  the  approval  of  all  persons,  whether  militarists  or 
not.  It  does  not  follow,  however,  that  we  are  justified 
in  appointing  ourselves  as  policemen.  Not  alone  we,  but 
all  other  American  states,  have  a  right  to  participate  in 
maintaining  peace  in  this  hemisphere.  There  are  those 
who  feel  that  the  same  end  —  that  is,  peace  —  can  be 
achieved,  and  more  cheaply  and  effectively,  by  supporting 
the  Pan-American  Movement  instead  of  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine; but  the  former  receives  practically  no  backing  in 
comparison  to  the  latter,  certainly  not  from  the  Navy 
League.  And  the  policy  and  talk  of  these  advocates  of 
the  Monroe  Doctrine,  to  be  enforced  by  a  large  navy,  give 
color  to  the  "North  American  Peril"  known  to  our  south- 
ern sister  states. 

When  a  government  adopts  a  policy  it  presumably  has 
some  end  in  view,  and  presumably  will  abandon  a  policy 
when  it  has  achieved  that  end  or  when  the  conditions 
which  gave  birth  to  it  are  no  more.  The  Monroe  Doc- 
trine was  originally  designed  to  express  opposition  to 


OF  THE  NAVY  LEAGUE  11 

the  extension  of  the  political  and  territorial  systems  of 
Europe  to  this  side  of  the  water.  It  was  adopted  when 
American  states  were  weak.  Now  that  these  states  have 
grown  strong  and  are  able  to  take  care  of  themselves, 
and  that  Europe  has  largely  adopted  a  political  system 
like  our  own,  the  Monroe  Doctrine  has  served  its  original 
purpose.  There  is  no  longer  danger  that  Europe  will  try 
to  establish  a  monarchical  system  on  this  side  of  the  water. 
And  as  far  as  Europe's  attempting  to  gain  territory  on 
this  side  of  the  water  is  concerned,  surely  our  sister  states 
are  as  much  interested  in  that  as  we;  and  it  would  be 
better  to  co-operate  with  them  to  prevent  it,  than  to  drive 
them  into  friendship  and  perhaps  alliance  with  Europe 
against  us  by  our  overweening  attitude. 

Recently  an  unsuccessful  attempt  was  made  in  the 
Lodge  Resolution  (the  President  refusing  to  sign  it)  to 
give  the  Monroe  Doctrine  a  commercial  significance. 
Though  it  masqueraded  under  the  same  name,  it  was  not 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  at  all.  It  proposed  a  policy  which 
could  easily  be  developed  into  the  closed  door  in  the  West- 
ern Hemisphere.  To  assert  the  closed  door  here,  and  at  the 
same  time  insist  on  the  open  door  in  China  by  naval 
force  —  which  is  an  alleged  achievement  of  our  navy 
commended  by  the  Navy  League  (Reason  23)  — is  in- 
consistent. It  is  more  than  that  —  it  is  unjust,  and 
therefore  a  source  of  danger.  It  raises  the  suspicion  and 
resentment  of  Spanish  America.  So  that,  though  we 
are  now  told  that  we  need  a  strong  navy  to  protect  our 
weaker  sisters  against  Europe,  we  shall  presently  be 
told  that  we  need  a  stronger  navy  to  protect  us  from  these 
grown-up  sisters,  who  on  reaching  their  majority  have 
refused  longer  to  tolerate  our  interference  and  com- 
placent superiority.  Assuredly  Pan-Americanism  seems 


12  THE  SIXTY-SEVEN  REASONS 

to  have  more  possibilities  for  peace,  than  a  navy-sup- 
ported Monroe  Doctrine.  The  point  at  issue  is  not  mere- 
ly how  largely  the  navy  has  supported  a  national  policy, 
but  also,  and  chiefly,  how  just  that  policy  is.  If  we  have 
vicious  policies  backed  by  force  we  should  enthrone  the 
wrong;  for,  if  it  is  true,  as  one  of  the  "reasons"  states, 
that  "might  does  not  make  right,  but  right  backed  by 
might  is  irresistible,"  it  follows  that  wrong  backed  by 
might  is  also  irresistible.  The  question  is  not  what  might 
can  achieve,  but  what  is  right!  A  commission  of  the 
kind  advocated  by  the  Navy  League  would  do  well  to 
investigate  the  justice  of  our  national  policies  rather  than 
to  advocate  an  unlimited  navy  to  put  unjust  policies  into 
execution. 

History  is  adduced  to  show  the  need  for  a  strong 
navy.  "The  Union  was  preserved,  and  the  outcome  of 
the  War  of  Secession  was  determined,  as  much  by  the 
blockading  navy  as  by  the  army  of  the  North."  Now  all 
that  can  be  concluded  from  this  is  that  we  ought  to  have 
had  a  large  navy  at  the  time  of  the  Civil  War ;  or,  to  be 
more  exact,  after  the  war  began.  For,  what  possible 
profit  would  there  have  been  had  the  navy  been  a  hundred 
times  as  large  as  it  was,  when  the  conflict  began?  It 
would  simply  have  meant,  as  in  the  case  of  the  army, 
that  about  one-half  of  the  naval  forces  of  the  United 
States  would  have  joined  the  Confederacy.  Unless  it  be 
shown  that  present  conditions  are  the  same,  the  past 
cannot  be  used  to  prove  the  need  of  a  larger  navy  to-day. 
At  all  events,  history  cannot  be  used  so  casually  and  freely 
as  is  done  by  the  Navy  League.  Its  reasons  based  on 
history  exhibit  an  admirable  freedom  .in  dealing  with  the 
past.  Indeed,  history  is  simply  made  to  order.  Let  one 
example  test  the  "reasons"  based  on  history.  "The  navy 


OF  THE  NAVY  LEAGUE  13 

fought  and  won  the  war  of  1812."  This  may  be  described 
as  a  pious  fraud,  committed  in  the  name  of  patriotism. 
The  navy  fought  the  war'  —  as  though  the  army  had 
done  nothing !  'And  the  navy  won  the  war' ;  when  the 
truth  is  that,  despite  victorious  engagements  on  the  ocean 
and  the  Lakes,  by  October,  1813,  there  was  not  a  single 
ship  in  the  whole  American  navy  available  for  the  pro- 
tection of  our  sea-coast  against  the  successful  blockade 
and  landing  expedition  of  the  British ;  that  we  were  most 
anxious  to  secure  peace;  that  Great  Britain  refused  to 
give  any  guarantees  respecting  impressments  and  search, 
which  were  the  causes  of  the  war,  and  that  these  claims 
were  surrendered  in  practice  —  not  because  of  us  or  our 
navy  —  but  because  the  European  conditions  which  had 
given  rise  to  them  had  passed  with  Napoleon ;  that  cer- 
tain questions  which  could  not  be  settled  at  the  peace 
negotiations  were  left  to  arbitation,  and  were,  after  a 
century  of  bickering  and  threatening,  finally  and  success- 
fully settled  in  1910  by  the  Hague  Tribunal!  History 
treated  in  this  way,  will  prove  almost  anything.  But  even 
after  being  disfigured  as  is  here  shown,  the  war  of  1812 
does  not  argue,  as  the  Navy  League  assumes,  that  we 
need  a  larger  navy  in  1912. 

The  unexpectedness  of  war,  and  necessity  of  being 
prepared,  are  the  best  of  the  "reasons"  for  a  navy ;  which, 
as  stated,  "cannot  be  improvised."  Most  men  will  agree 
that  one  cannot  keep  his  tools  too  sharp;  but  that  is  no 
reason  for  filling  the  entire  premises  with  the  costliest  of 
tools.  Enough  good  tools  for  the  work  in  hand  is  what  is 
wanted.  And  this  brings  us  to  the  heart  of  the  whole  mat- 
ter: the  question  to  be  answered  is,  What  is  our  actual 
need  in  sea  power ? 

The  Circular  of  the  Navy  League  does  not  answer 
that  question.  Its  sixty-seven  reasons  simply  advocate 


14  THE  SIXTY-SEVEN  REASONS 

a  larger  navy.  Few  of  these  reasons  can  be  accepted  as 
absolutely  true;  none  of  them,  even  if  granted,  demon- 
strates that  our  navy  is  weak,  and  ought  to  be  increased. 
But  they  do  show  one  thing  conclusively:  that  a  Com- 
mission appointed  under  such  auspices,  and  actuated  by 
such  reasons,  would  be  a  highly  injurious  and  costly  ex- 
periment. 

The  composition  of  the  much  needed  commission  to 
investigate  our  need  for  a  navy,  is,  then,  of  the  highest 
importance.  To  appoint  naval  officers  solely,  would  have 
no  point.  We  already  know  what  they  are  likely  to  say. 
What  we  want  is  a  commission  which  shall  honestly 
investigate  what  present  or  prospective  enemies  we  have, 
how  largely  their  enmity  is  provoked  by  us  or  by  our 
policies,  how  much  this  friction  could  be  reduced  by 
honorable  and  peaceful  means  (such  as  peace  commis- 
sions, Pan-Americanism,  immunity  of  private  property 
at  sea),  how  much  effort  and  money  we  could  with 
advantage  devote  to  these  peaceful  means ;  and  in  view 
of  these  things,  how  large  an  army  and  navy  we  need 
for  defense.  We  want  this  commission  to  investigate 
what  influences  at  home  are  advocating  and  oppos- 
ing naval  expansion,  how  taxation  for  military  purposes 
is  affecting  the  people  and  its  relation  to  the  government, 
how  real  the  alleged  services  of  army  and  navy  in  the 
field  of  science,  education  and  chanty  are ;  in  short  we 
want  a  commission  that  will  give  us  a  naval  program 
based  on  the  honest  facts. 

Such  a  commission  must  obviously  be  composed  of 
men  who  represent  the  several  interests  of  our  country, 
and  not  of  special  pleaders.  It  must  consist  of  honest  men, 
men  who  respect  history,  who  have  primarily  the  inter- 
ests of  the  country  and  of  humanity,  and  not  of  some 
branch  of  the  service,  at  heart. 


APPENDIX 

(From  the  Circular  of  the  Navy  League,  the  numbers  being 
added  for  reference.) 


SIXTY-SEVEN  REASONS  FOR  A  STRONG  NAVY 

The  navy  legislation  of  pressing  importance  referred  to, 
naturally  involves  the  consideration  of  why  the  United  States 
should  maintain  a  strong  navy,  and  we  therefore  respectfully 
submit  for  your  consideration  the  following  sixty-seven  reasons 
and  aphorisms  bearing  thereon : 

SEA  POWER  AND  HISTORY 

1.  Sea  power  was  indispensable  to  the  success  of  the  War 
of  the  Revolution. 

2.  The  navy  suppressed  the  war  on  commerce  by  the  Pir- 
ates  of  the  Barbary   States. 

3.  The  navy  fought  and  won  the  War  of  1812. 

4.  The  Union  was  preserved,  and  the  outcome  of  the  War 
of  Secession  was  determined,  as  much  by  the  blockading  navy 
as  by  the  army  of  the  North. 

5.  National  humiliation  to  the  United  States  following  naval 
weakness  was  illustrated  by  the  humiliating  treatment  accorded 
to  American  seamen  in  Cuba  by  Spain  in  1873. 

6.  The  navy  decided  the  outcome  of  the  Spanish  War,  which 
would    never    have    taken    place    had    Spain   known   our   navy's 
Strength. 

7.  England's   navy   has    given    Great    Britain    uninterrupted 
peace  on  the  water  for  nearly  one  hundred  years  and  her  shores 
have  not  been  successfully  invaded  for  nearly  a  thousand  years. 

8.  China's   policy  of  evading  militarism  on  both  land  and 
sea  has  been  accompanied  by  disastrous  defeats  and  untold  hu- 
miliation. 

9.  Germany  was  once  defenceless  and  her  enemies  swarmed 
her  borders  and  took  possession  of  her  land. 

ip.  Germany  with  an  adequate  army  and  navy  has  been 
practically  free  from  war  on  land  or  sea  for  forty  years  and  more. 

11.  Turkey  lost  Tripoli  because  of  pitiful  naval  weakness. 

NATIONAL  DEFENCE 

12.  The  navy  is  our  main  defence. 

13.  Undefended  resources  invite  aggression. 

14.  The  navy  has  21,000  miles  of  coast  line  to  defend. 

15.  The   United   States   navy  has  more   harbors  with  large 
cities  and  a  larger  number  of  strategic  points  to  defend  than  has 
any  othe,r  nation's  navy. 


16  THE  SIXTY-SEVEN  REASONS 

16.  The  navy  must   defend   Porto  Rico,  the   Philippine  Is- 
lands, the  Hawaiian  Islands,  and  the  Panama  Canal. 

17.  "Better  to  be  despised  for  too  anxious  apprehensions  than 
be  ruined  by  too  confident  security." 

AMERICAN     POLICIES 

The  effectiveness  of  the  following  American  policies  de- 
pends finally  on  a  strong  navy,  viz. : 

18.  The  Monroe  Doctrine,*  particularly  in  its  relation  to  the 
West  Indies  and  lands  north  of  the  Amazon. 

19.  The  attitude  of  the  United   States  as  to  possession  or 
ownership  of  strategic  alien  harbors  and  coaling  stations. 

20.  The  neutrality  of  the  Panama  Canal,  including  the  nec- 
essary safeguarding  incident  to  the  passage  through  the  canal  of 
the  ships  of  belligerents,  when  other  nations  are  at  war. 

21.  The  restriction  of  Asiatic  immigration. 

22.  The  integrity  of  China. 

23.  The  open  door  of  trade  in  China. 

24.  Equal    rights    for    American    citizens    traveling    abroad, 
regardless  of  blood  and  religion. 

FROM  THE   STANDPOINT  OF  ECONOMICS 

25.  Battleships  are  cheaper  than  battles. 

26.  The  money  for  American  battleships  is  paid  to  American 
working-men,  American  builders,  and  American  craftsmen. 

27.  The  Navy  Department's  demand  for  higher  qualities  of 
steel  and  better  mechanical  devices  has  aided  directly  in  Amer- 
ica's successs  in  the  production  of  high  grade  steel  and  in  the 
building  of  bridges,  bicycles,  automobiles,  and  aeroplanes. 

28.  The  navy  is  a  school  of  efficiency,  teaching  many  trades ; 
teaching  discipline  and  cleanliness  to  young  men,  a  large  por- 
tion of  whom  are  so  young  that  they  can  hardly  be  considered 
as  producing  units. 

29.  The  navy  as  a  trade  school  has  been  called  "Our  Great 

*NOTE  i. — The  Monroe  Doctrine  went  by  default  from  1862 
to  1865  because  it  could  not  be  enforced  during  our  Civil  War. 
Napoleon  III,  wishing  to  colonize  Mexico,  placed  Maximilian  on 
the  throne,  through  the  aid  of  the  French  army,  and  against  the 
protests  of  the  IJnited  States.  The  close  of  the  Civil  War 
enabled  the  President  to  send  Sheridan  and  the  army  to  the 
Mexican  borders  and  naval  vessels  to  the  Mexican  coasts.  Na- 
poleon then  withdrew  his  troops,  Maximilian  was  captured,  and 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  again  in  force. 

NOTE  2. — The  Monroe  Doctrine  was  again  upheld  by  the 
presence  of  the  United  States  battleship  fleet  during  the  critical 
period  when  Germany  and  Great  Britain  virtually  declared  war 
against  Venezuela. 

NOTE  3. — Land  hunger  and  land  grabbing  are  as  much  in 
evidence  to-dav  as  in  any  period  of  the  world's  history. 


OF  THE  NAVY  LEAGUE  17 

National  University."  It  returns  to  civil  life  annually  as  many 
trained,  efficient,  and  patriotic  young  men  as  are  graduated  from 
the  five  leading  universities  of  the  country. 

30.  Germany's  prosperity  arid  national  efficiency  can,  to  no 
small  extent,  be  attributed  to  the  training  received  by  citizens  in 
her  army  and  navy. 

31.  The  annual  cost  of  the  navy,  which  is  about  $130,000,000 
for  1912,  is  cheap  insurance  against  the  cost  of  war,  and  represents 
approximately  the  cost  of  the  nation's  automobile  tires  for  1912. 

32.  The  navy  is  one  of  the  foundations  of  national  credit 
and  is  insurance  against  the  unsettled  conditions  of  trade  and 
commerce    which    would   be    co-incident    with    a    reputation    for 
naval  weakness. 

OUTSIDE  THE  SPHERE  OF  WAR 

The  following  services  have  been  rendered  by  the  navy: 

33.  The  suppression  of  the  African  slave  trade. 

34.  The  suppression  of  piracy. 

35.  The   opening    of   Japan. 

36.  The  opening  of  Korea. 

37.  Arctic  exploration  and  relief. 

38.  Protection  of  the  fur  seals. 

39.  Pioneer  work  of  Coast  and  Geodetic  Survey. 

40.  The  establishment  of  light-house  service. 

41.  Pioneer  work  of  the  Weather  Bureau. 

42.  The  work  of  the  Naval  Observatory  and  Hydrographic 
Office. 

43.  Explorations  and  preliminary  surveys  for  various  Isth- 
mian Canal  routes. 

44.  Frequent  protection  of  missionaries  and  citizens  abroad. 

45.  Frequent  prevention  of  insurrection  in  the  West  Indies 
and  the  Southern  Republics. 

46.  Friendly    offices    to   Cuba,    Panama,    San    Domingo   and 
Nicaragua. 

47.  Repeated  earthquake  and  famine  relief  at  Messina,  Mar- 
tinique and  San  Francisco;  in  Ireland  and  elsewhere. 

DIPLOMACY 

48.  The  weight  of  a  powerful  navy  gives  force  to  diplomacy. 

49.  Naval  power  is  a  legitimate  factor  in  international  set- 
tlements, because  it  is  the  evidence  of  national  efficiency. 

NATIONAL  PRESTIGE 

50.  George  Washington  said :  "There  is  a  rank  due  to  the 
United    States    among   nations    which    will    be    withheld,    if   not 
absolutely  lost,  by  the  reputation  of  weakness.     If  we  desire  to 
avoid  insult,  we  must  be  able  to  repel  it.     If  we  desire  to  secure 
peace,  one  of  the  most  powerful  instruments  of  our  rising  pros- 
perity, it  must  be  known  that  we  are  at  all  times  ready  for  war." 


18  THE  SIXTY-SEVEN  REASONS 


PEACE    PROGRAMS 

51.  Disarmament  and  obligatory  arbitration  are  incompatible. 

52.  Armament  may  be  the  instrument  to  force  the  adversary 
to  arbitrate. 

53.  The  general  arbitration  treaties  adopted  at  the  Second 
Hague  Conference  and  other  international  treaties  failed  to  pre- 
vent the  forcible  annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  by  Aus- 
tria;  the  seizure  of  Tripoli  by  Italy;  the  invasion  of  Persia  by 
Russia,  and  the  terrible  war  in  the  Balkans. 

54.  The  military  powers  of  Europe  declined  to  enter  into  the 
Second   Hague   Conference  if  the  limitation  of  armament  were 
included  in  the  program  of  subjects  for  consideration. 

55-  Arbitrators'  decisions  have  not  always  been  accepted. 

56.  Navies  will  be  needed  to  enforce  the  decree  of  a  Court 
of  Arbitration. 

57.  "Adequate   armament  and   effective  arbitration  are   cor- 
relative agencies  for  national  security  and  for  international  peace 
and  justice." 

PEACE 

58.  "Wouldst  thou  conjure  upon  any  country  the  clouds  of 
war  —  induce  its  government  to  disarm." 

59.  "Obviously,   the   permanent  peace   of  the  world  can  be 
secured    only    through    the    gradual    concentration    of   the    pre- 
ponderant military  strength  into  the  hands  of  the  mosjt  pacific 
communities." 

60.  Power  and  strength  are  essential  for  the  noble  task  of 
peace  maker. 

GENERAL    REASONS 

61.  The  unexpectedness  of  war. 

62.  A  modern  navy  can  not  be  improvised. 

63.  In   the    family   of   nations,   any   one   disturbing   element 
may  cause  a  brawl. 

64.  Might  does  not  make  right,  but  right  backed  by  might 
is  irresistible. 

65.  Negative  righteousness  means  abstaining  from  evil,  but 
positive  righteousness  may  require  a  fight  against  evil. 

66.  "When  the  great  interests  of  a  nation,  her  dignity,  her 
rights,  the  resources  of  her  livelihood  or  even  her  liberty  and 
her  honor  are  at  stake,  men  are  in  duty  bound  to  go  to  war,  to 
wage   battle   and   risk  their  lives.     There   are   considerations   in 
this  world  which  are  higher  than  human  lives.    There  are  super- 
human interests,  there  are  ideals  dearer  than  our  own  persons, 
for  which  it   is  worth  while  struggling,   suffering,   fighting  and 
dying.     Life  is  not  the  highest  boon  of  existence,  and  no  senti- 
mental  reasons  based  on  the  notion  of  the  sacredness  of  life, 
will  abolish  struggle  in  the  world  or  make  war  impossible." 


M306591 


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